The Meditations of Descartes have a property almost unique to them which I will call during the course of this paper "linear subjectivity." Lin ear subjectivity is the manifestation of any argument that is presented as purely a work of its author, drawn only from the perceptions and resources of that author (hence subjective), whose strength lies not in collaboration with the reasonings of others or in the use of empirical supporting evi dence, but rather in the author's careful, rational, linear progression from one of his ideas to the next throughout the course of the argument. It is this strategy, both subjective and linear, which Descartes employs throughout his Meditations, and in this paper it is my intention to show that there is a crucial place in the third Meditation, most notably, in which Descartes' otherwise largely successful use of this linear subjectivity suddenly and tragically breaks down, the point at which Descartes fails to convince argumentatively that it was God who put the idea of God in him, and that he did not create the concept himself.
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The Meditations of Descartes have a property almost unique to them which I will call during the course of this paper "linear subjectivity." Lin ear subjectivity is the manifestation of any argument that is presented as purely a work of its author, drawn only from the perceptions and resources of that author (hence subjective), whose strength lies not in collaboration with the reasonings of others or in the use of empirical supporting evi dence, but rather in the author's careful, rational, linear progression from one of his ideas to the next throughout the course of the argument. It is this strategy, both subjective and linear, which Descartes employs throughout his Meditations, and in this paper it is my intention to show that there is a crucial place in the third Meditation, most notably, in which Descartes' otherwise largely successful use of this linear subjectivity suddenly and tragically breaks down, the point at which Descartes fails to convince argumentatively that it was God who put the idea of God in him, and that he did not create the concept himself.
Before the crucial place of breakdown can be sufficientlyappreciated, however, it is necessary to acknowledge the special problems that linear subjectivity presents for Descartes-problems that do not trouble other, comparableworks-butat the same time acknowledgethat for a fair amount of the third Meditation linear subjectivity does allow Descartes to pursue the foundation of trustworthy reasoning he was seeking. The breakdown of the third Meditation therefore is not inherently in the style of argument, but rather in what seems to be Descartes' eventual misapplication of it. If we begin our examination of linear subjectivity by noting how its absence af fects comparable philosophical works, we may immediately get a sense of both its advantages and disadvantages for Descartes when he uses it as a central part of the Meditations, especially the third Meditation.
Most philosophical ideas are advanced in mediares, in the middle of a line of inquiry. Before the newest treatment of a philosophical idea is pro posed, its author pays tribute to some treatment ( to the three angles of the other triangle and the ratios between the measures of the corre sponding sides all equal are said to be similar." 8Here,the term"Logic"specifically refers to thesetof internal principles whichwe use to make our world intelligible. the foundations of the things which we usuallyassume we "know," is a far more difficult task than using those obscure, perhaps unknowable founda tions of reason as a background for clearer, unquestionably rational arenas like symbolic logic,simply because thesearenas are easier to speakabout and demonstrate. If we ask aboutthe basis upon which these principles of logicrest,however, wefindourselves as Descartes does,beingaskedrather to scrutinize the minds with which we scrutinize, and to struggle in an attempt to connect ourselves with, if not peer into, the mind of God.
All of thishas bearing on Descartes' Meditations, mostdisastrously in the third, for we find that by not beginning his arguments with certainaxi oms or a set of pre-determined principles as givens, he has stripped his argument ofa lotofarmor which would normally have protected itthrough outthecourse of hisreasoning; hehasforfeited theadvantages which most other philosophers accept, giving up the benefits of initial reader agree ment, extended onus, and protection from the necessity of a fundamental proof. Instead, Descartes places his trust exclusively in linear subjectivity, believing that this strategy will not leave him prostrate in the argumenta tive battlefield, but will rather allow him to reach a fundamental state of doubt from which he may determine, absolutely, what it is hecan know for certain.
Unfortunately, Descartes begins his argument with a sizeable uncer tainty. This uncertainty is rooted in an entity he refers to as "the natural light" or"thelight ofreason." Descartes did not feel there was any unclarity contained in his conceptionof the light of reason, and in a certain mode of thinking, he was right. It is true he has a "clear and distinct" idea of the light of reason in thesense that herecognized it as an entity separate from other things-specifically, he felt it was the entity which allows each hu man being to discover truth, andallows him or her to behave rationally in accordance with that knowledge. 
